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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND, : Case No. 20040502-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) whereby 
the court of appeals has jurisdiction over first degree felony cases transferred from the 
supreme court. A copy of the judgment is in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence supported a 
charge of aggravated robbery where the defendant had his hand in his pocket and 
demanded money but did not show the clerk a weapon or facsimile and did not make any 
verbal representations about a gun or weapon.1 
Standard of review. '"The correct interpretation of a statute is question of law and 
is reviewed for correctness.'" State v. Pixton. 2004 UT App 275, f 4, 506 Utah Adv. 
1
 A similar issue is before this Court in the state's interlocutory appeal in State v. 
Ryan Wayne Johnson, Case No. 20040522-CA. In that case, the trial court granted 
Appellee's motion to reduce the charge to simple robbery. 
Rep. 31 (quoting State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993)). 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 38-41, 54-61, 114. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES 
The text of the following statutes is in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b) (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an Information filed December 9, 2003, the state charged Appellant William 
Ireland ("Appellant" or "Ireland") with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), and theft of services, a class B 
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-409 (2003). Following bind-over 
(R. 28), Ireland made a motion to reduce the charge of aggravated robbery to a second 
degree felony and filed a memorandum in support of that motion. R. 38-41. After the 
state responded (R. 42-44), the trial court held a hearing on the motion on March 17, 
2004. R. 114. The trial court subsequently denied the motion on March 29, 2004, and 
entered its Memorandum Decision denying the motion on April 2, 2004. R. 54-61. 
A copy of the Memorandum Decision is in Addendum C. 
Ireland entered a conditional plea of guilty to aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony. R. 73-80. Pursuant to that conditional plea, Ireland explicitly reserved the right 
to appeal the denial of his motion to reduce the aggravated robbery charge to simple 
2 
robbery. R. 73. The trial court sentenced Ireland on June 7, 2004, and entered judgment 
on that same day. R. 94-95. Ireland filed a timely notice of appeal on June 11, 2004. 
R. 96. This appeal follows. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 6, 2003, Jeffrey Reinkoester worked as a sales associate in the 
Fortier jewelry store on the north end of Gateway Plaza in Salt Lake City. R. 114:5-6. 
Sometime between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., Reinkoester saw a man, later identified as 
Appellant William Ireland, outside the store, walking toward the store. R. 114:6. Ireland 
entered the store and Reinkoester greeted him. R. 114:9. Appellant responded by 
saying, "I want you to go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now.'1 
R. 114:9. 
It was cold outside and Ireland was wearing a large, puffy, perhaps down, coat. 
R. 114:10, 11, 19. Reinkoester did not see Ireland's bare hands, and one hand was in a 
pocket. R. 114:11. Reinkoester acknowledged that because of the cold, people often 
entered the store with their hands in their pockets. R. 114:19. Reinkoester could not 
remember whether Ireland reached out and opened the door with a hand or whether he 
pushed or pulled the door open. R. 114:17. 
The hand in Ireland's pocket was close to his body but pointed toward 
Reinkoester. R. 114:11. Reinkoester described it as "gesturing like there was weapon, 
but it was more subtle." R. 114:12. Appellant never said he had a weapon or made any 
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verbal statements suggesting that he had a weapon. R. 114:13,23. Nevertheless, 
Reinkoester testified that he thought Ireland might have a gun. R. 114:13, 23. 
Reinkoester acknowledged that his thoughts about a gun were just speculation and that 
he had no concrete reason for speculating that Appellant had a gun as opposed to a knife. 
R. 114:23. When Reinkoester filled out the police report, he did not say anything about 
the robber having his hands in his pockets; he did indicate that there might have been a 
weapon in the robber's pocket, "if there was one." R. 114:25-26, 29. 
Reinkoester walked around to the desk where the cash drawer was located. 
R. 114:10. He was not looking at Appellant and instead was focused on the cash drawer. 
R. 114:21. When Reinkoester got to the desk with the cash drawer, he put what little 
cash the store had in a bag; Appellant then asked for jewelry to be added to the bag. 
R. 114:13,14. 
While at the cash drawer, Reinkoester could not see Appellant's hands because 
the desk with the cash drawer was too high. R. 114:14. Reinkoester did not know 
whether Ireland's hands were inside or outside his pockets at that point. R. 114:22. 
Appellant did not make any physical gestures toward Reinkoester at any time while 
Reinkoester was at the desk getting the cash. R. 114:22. 
There were four other employees and two customers in the store while the robbery 
was taking place. R. 114:12. At about the time Appellant asked for jewelry, the owner 
of the store noticed that something was wrong and exited the store. R. 114:14. Ireland 
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asked Reinkoester to give him the bag, then went to the front door. R. 114:15. 
Reinkoester could not recall whether Ireland took the bag with his right or left hand and 
could not remember whether he ever saw Ireland's right hand outside of the pocket. 
R. 114:15. 
The owner was blocking the door, but Appellant pushed and finally got the door 
open. R. 114:15. The owner then chased Ireland and retrieved the bag and money. 
R. 114:15; 116:4. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in refusing to reduce the charge from aggravated to simple 
robbery. All robberies involve a threat and fear by the victim. In order to elevate a 
robbery to an aggravated robbery, the conduct of the defendant, not the subjective 
reaction of the victim, controls. Moreover, in order to maintain the distinction between 
an aggravated and simple robbery, the defendant must do more than create a threat or 
cause fear; instead, the defendant must make a tangible representation that he has an item 
and, further, make a tangible representation that the item in his control is capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury. A hand in a pocket pointed in the direction of the 
victim, in the absence of a verbal representation, fails to rise to this level. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
CHARGE SHOULD NOT BE REDUCED TO A SIMPLE ROBBERY 
WHERE APPELLANT DID NOT DISPLAY A GUN AND DID NOT 
MAKE A VERBAL REPRESENTATION REGARDING THE USE OF A 
GUN. 
The only issue in this case is whether the charge should have been reduced from 
aggravated to simple robbery where Appellant had his hand in his pocket and pointed 
toward the salesclerk when he entered the store, but made no verbal representations or 
threats about the use of a gun. 
In State v. Suniville. 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), the supreme court held that the 
defendant did not commit an aggravated robbery where he had his hand in his pocket 
held up over the counter as if he had a gun, with something pointing at the victim, and 
made threats that he would "blast" people if they did not cooperate. \d_. at 962. The 
version of section 76-6-302 then in effect defined aggravated robbery as a robbery where 
the perpetrator used lf a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm." Id- The Suniville court 
concluded that the defendant's actions did not amount to an aggravated robbery because 
he did not use a weapon or a replica of a weapon. IdL at 964-65. In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court reasoned that any other holding would "erode the statutory 
distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery." Id., at 965. The court stated in 
part, "Defendant's menacing gesture accompanied by verbal threats is not sufficient 
evidence alone to establish the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. To hold 
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otherwise would pervert the language of section 76-6-302 and erode the statutory 
distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery." Id.. 
Following the decision in Suniville, the legislature amended the aggravated 
robbery and dangerous weapon statutes. The current version requires the use or 
threatened use of a dangerous weapon and defines a dangerous weapon in part as a 
facsimile or representation of a dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-302 (2003), 
76-1-601 (2003). Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), which outlines the elements for 
aggravated robbery, states, "(1) [a] person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601." Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b) (2003) defines a dangerous 
weapon as "a facsimile or representation of an item, and (i) the actor's use or apparent 
intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury; or (ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any 
other manner that he is in control of such an item." Id., (emphasis added). 
Under the current version of the statute, this Court has interpreted the term 
representation in the dangerous weapon statute to include a verbal representation that one 
has a firearm. See State v. Candelario. 909 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. 
Adams, 830 P.2d 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Nevertheless, the concerns outlined in 
Suniville that the distinction between aggravated and simple robbery must be maintained 
and that defendant must do or say something tangible beyond the force and fear involved 
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in any robbery continue to control. This Court's holdings that a verbal representation by 
the robber that he has a gun is sufficiently tangible to support an aggravated robbery 
maintains a distinction between the two crimes that is lost when a hand in the pocket 
without verbal representations is used to elevate the crime. 
For example, the defendant in Candelario claimed to have a gun and threatened to 
kill the clerk but did not physically portray possession of a firearm. Id., at 277. Under 
these circumstances, the determination of whether a gun was involved was not left to the 
subjective reaction of the victim because the defendant verbally represented that he had a 
gun. This Court concluded that the term "representation" refers not only to a physical 
likeness, but also to "a statement conveying an impression for the purpose of influencing 
action." Id. at 278. 
The robber in Adams verbally threatened to use a gun while also "put[ting] his 
hand on his bulging pocket, leading [the victim] to believe [the robber] had a gun and 
reasonably fear for her safety." Adams, 830 P.2d at 313. This Court upheld the 
aggravated robbery conviction because "[threatening to use a dangerous weapon while 
committing a robbery . . . is sufficient to fit within the aggravated robbery . . . statute[]." 
Id. In reaching the decision in Adams, this Court relied on State v. Hartmann, 783 P.2d 
544 (Utah 1989), which upheld a conviction for aggravated sexual assault where the 
defendant raped a woman while verbally telling her that he had a gun. IcL This Court 
concluded in Hartmann that the use or display of a dangerous weapon is not required 
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when the defendant makes a verbal threat to use a dangerous weapon. Id., at 547. 
Recently, in State v. Revos. 2004 UT App 151,91 P.3d 861, this Court again held 
that a defendant's statements that he had a gun were a representation that elevated a 
robbery to an aggravated robbery even if the defendant did not have a gun. In that case, 
the defendant yelled, "[g]et the gun and shoot" and "shoot to kill." Id_., 1f 4. This Court 
reasoned that defendant's statement "clearly conveyed an impression' that a gun would 
be used for the purpose of influencing action[]" and the aggravated robbery charge was 
therefore appropriate. Id-
Pursuant to Adams, Candelario, Hartmann, and Reyos, a charge of aggravated 
robbery would have been appropriate //Appellant had made verbal representations 
regarding a gun. Appellant did not make any such verbal representations, however, and 
instead simply had his hand in his pocket and had it pointed at the clerk. To be convicted 
of aggravated robbery, Ireland had to have "use[d] or threatened] to use a dangerous 
weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. The dangerous weapon statute requires a 
representation, that is, some sort of likeness, coupled with either a verbal representation 
that the item is a dangerous weapon or some representation "in any other manner" that 
the robber is in control of an item that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b). 
The use of the word "and" in section 76-l-601(5)(b) demonstrates that something 
more than just a representation of an item is required; instead, the defendant must make a 
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representation of an item and further represent that the item is likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury. Even if the hand in the pocket were considered a "representation 
of an item," it fails to meet the requirements of subsection (ii) since it does not amount to 
a representation that the item is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In fact, 
in this case, Reinkoester speculated that there was a weapon in the pocket but had no 
basis for determining whether the item in the pocket was a gun or a knife or capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury. R. 114:23. The witness's testimony that he was 
afraid Appellant might shoot was his subjective response to the fear he felt during the 
robbery and was based on speculation rather than a representation by Ireland that he had 
a weapon capable of causing serious bodily injury. Allowing a witness's subjective 
reaction under circumstances that necessarily involve threats and fear fails to make a 
workable distinction between simple and aggravated robbery. 
The court in Williams v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1986), 
concluded that the defendant did not commit an aggravated robbery where he "threatened 
the night clerk by reaching towards his back pocket and cautioning, "Do you want your 
life?" Id. at 711. Similar to the present case, the clerk in that case testified "that when he 
was threatened, he believed 'maybe he (Appellant) had a weapon or something.'" Id.. In 
rejecting the aggravated robbery charge, the court recognized that threat of harm exists in 
simple robbery as well as aggravated robbery, and the two charges must be distinguished 
by something other than the threat of physical harm. Id. Moreover, the victim's response 
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to a threat cannot define the nature of the crime and a victim's speculation that there 
might have been a weapon does not support an aggravated robbery charge. This is so 
because the degree of the crime would be left to the subjective response of the victim, not 
the actions of the perpetrator. Id. at 712. 
To do otherwise places defendant virtually without defense at the caprice 
of a victim's subjective evaluation without regard to the actual course of 
events and could lead to convictions for crimes neither intended nor 
enacted. Our heritage of justice applies the law to the facts. Herein the fact 
is that although force was threatened, the presence of a weapon or 
instrument was illusory at best. Without an instrument's ever being seen, 
an intimidating threat, albeit coupled with a menacing gesture cannot 
suffice to meet the standard necessary for a first degree robbery conviction. 
Id. at 712. While a verbal threat to use a gun would suffice for an aggravated robbery 
charge, in Williams where the defendant threatened only to hurt then reached toward his 
back pocket, the facts did not rise to an aggravated robbery. Indeed, labeling a crime as 
an armed robbery under these circumstances would blur the distinction between simple 
and aggravated robbery. The Williams court recognized this, stating: 
This, however, does not distinguish it from second degree robbery in which 
the threat of physical force is the gravamen. A response of perceiving 
danger is quite real under threat; however, such cannot serve to convert 
something merely speculated upon (a weapon or instrument) into 
established existence . . . . Without an instrument's ever being seen, an 
intimidating threat albeit coupled with a menacing gesture cannot suffice to 
meet the standard necessary for a first-degree robbery conviction . . . . 
Without something tangible backing up the threat, words do not reach 
beyond the status of threats and as such are insufficient to sustain 
submission under first-degree robbery. 
Williams. 721 S.W. 2d at 72, 713. 
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Focusin^ on the actions of the defendant rather than the subjective response of the 
victim is consistent not only with Suniville but also with the language of subsection (ii) 
which requires the robber to represent that he is in control of an item that the victim 
reasonably believes is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. This reasonable 
belief language necessarily involves an objective review of the defendant's conduct 
rather than a focus on the victim's subjective reaction. 
The trial court in this case improperly focused on the witness's subjective belief 
rather than the objective facts of what Ireland did in concluding that the charge should 
not be reduced to simple robbery. In so doing, the trial court eroded the distinction 
between the two charges and left defendants "at the caprice of a victim's subjective 
evaluation" (id. at 712) in determining whether an aggravated robbery was committed. 
The trial court also relied on decisions from other states which do not control and 
which address statutory language distinct from that in Utah. For example, in People v. 
Knowles. 436 N.Y.S. 2d 25, 79 A.D. 2d 116 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1981), relied on by the trial 
court at R. 59, the court was interpreting a statute that made it a second degree felony to 
"[display] [] what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other 
firearm." Id. at 116. Under New York's statutory scheme, use of a loaded and operable 
gun was a first degree felony whereas display of what appears to be a gun, but was not in 
actuality a loaded and operable gun, was a second degree felony. Id., at 118-119. The 
issue in Knowles was whether the use of a hand fit within this middle level of severity 
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rather than the lower third degree felony category applied to robberies when the 
perpetrator did not display what appeared to be a gun. Based on the language of the 
second degree robbery statute and the New York statutory scheme delineating three 
levels of robbery, the court concluded that use of a hand fit within the middle level of 
severity. 
The Delaware statute under consideration in State v. Lawrence, 2001 Del. Super. 
LEXIS 318 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2001), affd. 790 A.2d 476 (Del. 2002), also relied 
on by the trial court in this case at R. 59, defined a first degree robbery as a robbery 
where the "defendant 'display' what 'appears' to be a deadly weapon." Id_. at 7. The 
defendant in that case "had cloth wrapped around his hand and jabbed it in the victim's 
direction. When Defendant struck her in the left cheek, it apparently felt like a hard 
object." Id. at 8. Under these facts, the defendant "displayed" what "appeared" to be a 
deadly weapon; see also DeLeon v. Arkansas, 1989 Ark App. Lexis 608 (1999) (relied 
on by the trial court at R. 59-60) (interpreting statute that states, "[a] person commits 
aggravated robbery if he commits robbery, while armed with a deadly weapon, or 
represents by work or conduct that he is so armed"). 
As the supreme court recognized in Suniville, the distinction between aggravated 
and simple robbery would be eviscerated if a hand in the pocket without verbal threats to 
kill or use a gun would elevate the crime to an armed robbery. All robberies necessarily 
involve fear by the victim and threats causing this fear which propels the victim to 
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respond to the robber's request. But a robbery where the robber actually carries a gun, 
facsimile or other dangerous weapon or represents that he has a gun raises a far greater 
threat than a robbery such as this one where the robber simply had his hand in his pocket, 
pointed toward the victim. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Defendant William Joseph Ireland respectfully requests that the order of 
the trial court denying his motion to reduce the charge to a second degree felony be 
reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court to allow him to withdraw his 
conditional plea. 
SUBMITTED this n ^ day of September, 2004. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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5th Floor, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031908349 FS 
Judge: PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
Date: June 7, 2004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: nicolel 
Prosecutor: BOWN, GREGORY L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): PETERSON, MICHAEL A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 20, 1967 
Video 
Tape Number: Video Tape Count: 9:18 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/05/2004 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Page 1 
<?4 
Case No: 031908349 
Date: Jun 07, 2004 
Credit is granted for 185 day(s) previously served. 
Defense motions court to sentence defendant as second degree felony 
based on rule 402. State objects to motion. 
Page 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in 
a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads 
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other 
manner that he is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act 
and the actor is capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, govern-
ment, partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise 
dominion or control over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to 
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, 
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function 
of any bodily member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, 
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being 
preserved. 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 031908349 
vs. : 
WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter was brought before the Court by Motion on March 
17, 2004. The State has brought aggravated robbery charges against 
defendant William Joseph Ireland, pursuant to Section 76-6-302, 
Utah Code Ann. Mr. Ireland has waived his right to a jury trial, 
and intends to enter a guilty plea. The sole issue before the 
Court is whether Mr. Ireland is guilty of a first or second degree 
felony. Mr. Ireland is prepared to admit that on December 6, 2003, 
he entered Fortier Jewelers located in the Gateway Mall at 11 S. 
Rio Grande Street, and demanded jewelry and money from a store 
employee. 
The testimony of the employee/witness established that the 
defendant entered the store with his right hand in his coat pocket. 
The coat was described as large and puffy, perhaps a parka. The 
defendant's hand was held close to his right side, with the elbow 
extending toward the back or behind the defendant. While the 
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defendant's hand was in this position, he told the witness, "I want 
you to go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now." 
The witness described the defendant's action as: "There was one 
hand in a pocket, gesturing like there was a gun." (Hearing Tr. p. 
11.) The witness also described the defendant's hand in the 
defendant's coat pocket as "pointing at me." (Hearing Tr. p. 11.) 
He further described the defendant's hand as "it was definitely 
gesturing like there was a weapon, but it was more subtle." 
(Hearing Tr. p. 12.) The witness then testified that he thought 
the defendant had a weapon based on the motioning of the 
defendant's hand in the defendant's coat pocket. (Hearing Tr. p. 
13.) 
The witness admitted he did not know whether the defendant had 
a gun and that he never saw a gun, but assumed the defendant had a 
gun because of the gesturing of the defendant' s hand in the 
defendant's coat pocket. (Hearing Tr. at p. 16.) Additionally, 
the bulge in the defendant's pocket, and the way it looked, pointed 
at the witness led the witness to believe the defendant had a 
weapon. (Hearing Tr. at p. 27.) At the time of the robbery, the 
witness felt that the defendant may have had a weapon in his hand, 
and the witness testified that he was afraid that he might be shot 
if he did not comply with the defendant's request. (Hearing Tr. at 
p. 27.) It was the witness's further impression that the defendant 
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intended to make the witness believe that the defendant had a gun 
in his pocket; and he did so believe. (Hearing Tr. at p.28.) 
The issue before the Court is whether a nonverbal gesture 
constitutes a "representation" of a dangerous weapon pursuant to 
Section 76-1-601, Utah Code Ann. This issue appears to be one of 
first impression in the state of Utah. 
In State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court overturned an aggravated robbery conviction based on 
a prior statute where the defendant had stated, "This is a robbery, 
don!t turn it into a homicide. Give me all of your money." Jd. at 
962. The defendant approached the teller with his right hand 
inside of his coat pocket, which he lifted over the counter. The 
witness testified that, "something was pointing at me in his 
pocket." Id. at 962. Based upon those facts and the statute in 
effect at the time, the Supreme Court stated that the defendant had 
not used a firearm, or a facsimile of a firearm, or a deadly 
weapon. Id. at 965 (relying on Utah Code Ann., Section 76-6-302 
(1975), which stated that " [a] person commits aggravated robbery if 
in the course of committing robbery, he: (a) uses a firearm or a 
facsimile of a firearm...or a deadly weapon...."). 
In apparent response to the Suniville decision, the 
legislature amended Section 76-6-302, Utah Code Ann., which reads 
in pertinent part: 
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(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in 
the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon.... 
Section 76-1-601, defines "dangerous weapon" as: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the 
item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent 
intended use of the item leads the victim to 
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) The actor represents to the 
victim verbally or in any other manner that he 
is in control of such an item. 
A review of the case law in this state since Suniville 
indicates that convictions of defendants have been upheld where a 
defendant made a verbal representation that he or she has a gun or 
will use a gun or a weapon and the statement is accompanied with a 
show of an apparent weapon, that is, a hand in a pocket. See, 
e.g., State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310 (Utah App. 1992). This Court 
must decide whether a representation may be made by a hand and 
gestures of the hand absent a verbal representation. This Court 
concludes that the elements of the crime alleged in this case have 
been met by the defendant's gestures as set forth above. 
In the case before the Court, the witness clearly indicated he 
felt the defendant had a weapon. As the Court indicated during the 
course of the hearing, it is not fair, reasonable or wise to place 
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the burden upon a witness to inquire whether or not a bulge in the 
defendant's pocket is or is not a weapon. 
It defies logic to allow a defendant to induce a victim to 
believe the defendant has a weapon and thereby coerce a victim to 
perform some act based on the defendant's representations and then 
allow the defendant to benefit when it is later shown the defendant 
in fact had no such weapon. The Court finds in this case that the 
defendant's placement of his hand in his pocket and the gesturing 
accompanying it, as testified to by the witness, constituted a 
representation. Therefore, the State is within its discretion in 
charging this matter as a first degree felony. 
Although the statutory language governing aggravated robbery 
seems to clearly encompass the defendant's actions, this Court is 
further persuaded that the defendant can be charged with aggravated 
robbery by the case law of other states interpreting statutes 
similar to ours. Whether a weapon or a facsimile is actually 
displayed in the commission of a crime, or a verbal representation 
that such a weapon is in the possession of the perpetrator, or 
whether the representation is made by menacing gestures, the effect 
is the same on the victim. A facsimile of a gun can cause no more 
harm than leading one to believe the perpetrator actually has a 
gun, whether by word or action. The Utah statute is similar to 
that found in New York. New York's law reads: 
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A person is guilty of robbery in the second 
degree if he forcibly steals property and if, 
in the course of the commission of the crime 
he "[displays] what appears to be a pistol, 
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or 
other firearm." 
N.Y. Penal Law § 160.10(2) (b) , as quoted in People v. Knowles, 436 
N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1981). The Supreme Court appellate division 
of New York held in Knowles: 
We hold today that if a person who is in fact 
unarmed commits a robbery and, in the course 
thereof, positions his hand in his pocket in a 
manner that is intended to convey to his 
victim the impression that he is holding a 
firearm, that said person has committed 
robbery in the second degree within the 
meaning of the statute quoted above. 
436 N.Y.2d at 25. 
Delaware's statute is also similar to Utah's, and in State v. 
Lawrence, 2001 Del. Super. Lexis 318 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 
2001), aff 'd, 790 A.2d 476 (Del. 2002), held that the term 
"displays" included a defendant's act of wrapping a cloth around 
his hand so that it appeared to hide a gun, and where the victim 
reasonably felt that the defendant was armed. 
The facts of this case are very similar to Deleon v. Arkansas, 
1989 Ark. App., Lexis 608 (1999), which interpreted another statute 
much like Utah's. In Deleon, the defendant entered a convenience 
store to purchase a pack of cigarettes, and stated to the clerk, 
"Would you mind filling me up a sack?" .Id. at *2. As the clerk 
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reached for a bag, he noticed that the man had his hand in his 
pocket. Id. The clerk testified, "I figured he had a weapon in his 
pocket or a gun." Id. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas stated 
that when the defendant put his hand in his pocket, he did so "for 
the purpose of inducing the belief that he was armed with a deadly 
weapon and that although he used no threatening words [as to the 
use of a weapon] , his conduct had the desired effect upon the 
victim," who perceived the defendant's actions to be menacing or 
threatening. Id. at *4. 
This Court believes that the reasoning of these cases is sound 
and consistent with the terms of Utah's revised statute, and 
concludes that "representation" includes not only words, but 
threatening gestures and movements which would indicate the 
defendant is in possession of a dangerous weapon. 
The State's filing of this action as a first degree felony is 
upheld. 
The State is to prepare the appropriate Findings, Conclusions 
and an Order. X>W--" ••: *i\ 
Dated this <*-~~ day of April, J^'4wJ 
I 
PAUL G?" &AUGHAN / /) 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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